Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is arguably TU Delft%s most famous (or infamous) alumnus. Khan received a MSc degree in metallurgy from Delft in 1967 and later stole nuclear secrets from his Dutch employer, helping Pakistan develop its first nuclear bomb.
Post-9/11, should foreign students be trusted with dual-use technology?
Long celebrated as the “Father of Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb”, Dr A. Q. Khan’s rags to scientific riches life story should inspire all those patriotic foreign students who believe the geopolitical ends justify the means%in this case, nuclear espionage.
Khan, 66, who was born to a modest family in present day India in 1936, migrated to Pakistan in 1952, following millions of other Muslims who left India when the subcontinent was partitioned. After graduating from school in Karachi, Khan went to Europe in 1961 to continue his studies. First in Germany, at the Technische Universität of West Berlin, then at TU Delft, where he received a MSc degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967, before finally earning a Ph.D. in metallurgy from the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) in 1972. Khan then went to work for Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), in Amsterdam, a period of employment that would later become the basis of his trial and conviction (in absentia) in the Netherlands on espionage charges.
Security at FDO, a subcontractor to Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the Dutch partner of the British/German/Dutch uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium URENCO, was exceedingly lax. Within a week of starting work, Khan was sent to the UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands. Although Khan didn%t have security clearance to visit this facility, he did so repeatedly during his employment. Moreover, the multi-lingual engineer translated highly classified technical documents describing the centrifuges in detail, often taking the documents home, a serious breach of standard FDO procedure.
At UCN, Khan worked with two early centrifuge designs, the CNOR and SNOR machines; then, in late 1974, UCN asked Khan to translate highly classified design documents for two advanced German machines, the G-1 and G-2, which at the time represented the most sophisticated industrial enrichment technology in the world. While working at the Almelo facility, Khan enjoyed unsupervised access and was often seen writing notes in a foreign script; however, no attempts were made to stop him or investigate his activities.
In 1976, Khan suddenly left Europe before his espionage was detected. Back home in Pakistan, then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Khan the job of organizing Pakistan’s nuclear program, which, it was hoped, would provide an answer to India’s first nuclear explosion of 1974.
,,On July 31, 1976 the first real seeds of Pakistan’s nuclear program were sown,” Khan recalled in a newspaper article. ,,The date marks the turn in our beloved country’s destiny, as it was on this fateful day that the ‘Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL)’ was formed”. The aim of the secret laboratories was to establish a uranium enrichment plant and provide Pakistan with nuclear capability. Pakistan was put on the nuclear map of the world and a solid foundation was laid for our self-sufficiency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
ERL was soon producing substantial quantities of uranium and, in recognition of Khan’s contributions, the secret laboratory was renamed the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1981. Today, Pakistan%s arsenal of medium-range Ghauri nuclear missiles is capable of obliterating India and Khan, who, incidentally, denies the Dutch espionage charges, is a national hero, living in a luxurious villa where, it’s said, Pakistani security forces guard him as if he were the ruler of all Asia.
Dual-use
The idea of students from developing countries studying in the West and then returning home to use that knowledge to advance their societies is a beautiful one. Khan, however, personifies the ugly flip-side of this ideal, and although his espionage occurred after he left the TU, it was knowledge acquired and contacts made at the TU that helped his career flourish. Might the TU be unwittingly training another Khan today?
Certainly in the United States, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, foreign students are increasing viewed with suspicion if not outright distrust–especially students following “dual-use” subjects (i.e. those that could help their countries develop missiles and/or nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons).
Today, in fact, Bush and his fellow hawks want to attack Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring the type of nuclear centrifuge technology that Khan acquired in Europe for Pakistan. US intelligence reports allege that for years Hussein has been sending hundreds of Iraqi students abroad to study subjects that would help Baghdad develop its nuclear weapons program, and former FBI Director Louis Freeh testified recently before the US Congress that ,,some foreign governments ask foreign students specifically to acquire information on a variety of technical subjects and upon completion of their studies; some foreign students are then encouraged to seek employment with U.S. firms to steal proprietary information.”
At TU Delft, Geert Klaas Berghuijs, until recently a senior admissions officer, says TU admissions policy regarding foreign students hasn’t changed post-9/11: ,,When foreign students receive their TU letters of acceptance, they must report to the nearest Dutch embassy, which performs the necessary security-background checks before issuing residence permanents.” This security clearance procedure has become much more stringent, however: ,,In 1997, our MSc program’s first year, I sent the Dutch authorities a one-page letter containing the names of ten Indonesian students who wanted to study at Delft, and those students received their residence permits within 1O days. Today, background checks take at least six weeks before residence permits are issued.”
This heightened sense of awareness is echoed by Profesor Eduard Hoogenboom, whose Interfacutair Research Institute (IRI) works with some of the TU’s most potentially dangerous dual-use technology%nuclear and biological. ,,We’d certainly take a hard look at students applying from countries like Iraq and Libya who wanted to work with certain technologies,” Hoogenboom says. ,,We once had a student from Syria, but he came to us recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a UN agency. We certainly evaluate the type of work students intend to do, the level of risk and what knowledge they’d be taking away with them.”
As for the good/evil Dr. Khan, whose TU studies served his country so well, he certainly won’t be receiving his tickets to the TU Alumni Ball anytime soon.
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is arguably TU Delft%s most famous (or infamous) alumnus. Khan received a MSc degree in metallurgy from Delft in 1967 and later stole nuclear secrets from his Dutch employer, helping Pakistan develop its first nuclear bomb. Post-9/11, should foreign students be trusted with dual-use technology?
Long celebrated as the “Father of Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb”, Dr A. Q. Khan’s rags to scientific riches life story should inspire all those patriotic foreign students who believe the geopolitical ends justify the means%in this case, nuclear espionage.
Khan, 66, who was born to a modest family in present day India in 1936, migrated to Pakistan in 1952, following millions of other Muslims who left India when the subcontinent was partitioned. After graduating from school in Karachi, Khan went to Europe in 1961 to continue his studies. First in Germany, at the Technische Universität of West Berlin, then at TU Delft, where he received a MSc degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967, before finally earning a Ph.D. in metallurgy from the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) in 1972. Khan then went to work for Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), in Amsterdam, a period of employment that would later become the basis of his trial and conviction (in absentia) in the Netherlands on espionage charges.
Security at FDO, a subcontractor to Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the Dutch partner of the British/German/Dutch uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium URENCO, was exceedingly lax. Within a week of starting work, Khan was sent to the UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands. Although Khan didn%t have security clearance to visit this facility, he did so repeatedly during his employment. Moreover, the multi-lingual engineer translated highly classified technical documents describing the centrifuges in detail, often taking the documents home, a serious breach of standard FDO procedure.
At UCN, Khan worked with two early centrifuge designs, the CNOR and SNOR machines; then, in late 1974, UCN asked Khan to translate highly classified design documents for two advanced German machines, the G-1 and G-2, which at the time represented the most sophisticated industrial enrichment technology in the world. While working at the Almelo facility, Khan enjoyed unsupervised access and was often seen writing notes in a foreign script; however, no attempts were made to stop him or investigate his activities.
In 1976, Khan suddenly left Europe before his espionage was detected. Back home in Pakistan, then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Khan the job of organizing Pakistan’s nuclear program, which, it was hoped, would provide an answer to India’s first nuclear explosion of 1974.
,,On July 31, 1976 the first real seeds of Pakistan’s nuclear program were sown,” Khan recalled in a newspaper article. ,,The date marks the turn in our beloved country’s destiny, as it was on this fateful day that the ‘Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL)’ was formed”. The aim of the secret laboratories was to establish a uranium enrichment plant and provide Pakistan with nuclear capability. Pakistan was put on the nuclear map of the world and a solid foundation was laid for our self-sufficiency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
ERL was soon producing substantial quantities of uranium and, in recognition of Khan’s contributions, the secret laboratory was renamed the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1981. Today, Pakistan%s arsenal of medium-range Ghauri nuclear missiles is capable of obliterating India and Khan, who, incidentally, denies the Dutch espionage charges, is a national hero, living in a luxurious villa where, it’s said, Pakistani security forces guard him as if he were the ruler of all Asia.
Dual-use
The idea of students from developing countries studying in the West and then returning home to use that knowledge to advance their societies is a beautiful one. Khan, however, personifies the ugly flip-side of this ideal, and although his espionage occurred after he left the TU, it was knowledge acquired and contacts made at the TU that helped his career flourish. Might the TU be unwittingly training another Khan today?
Certainly in the United States, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, foreign students are increasing viewed with suspicion if not outright distrust–especially students following “dual-use” subjects (i.e. those that could help their countries develop missiles and/or nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons).
Today, in fact, Bush and his fellow hawks want to attack Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring the type of nuclear centrifuge technology that Khan acquired in Europe for Pakistan. US intelligence reports allege that for years Hussein has been sending hundreds of Iraqi students abroad to study subjects that would help Baghdad develop its nuclear weapons program, and former FBI Director Louis Freeh testified recently before the US Congress that ,,some foreign governments ask foreign students specifically to acquire information on a variety of technical subjects and upon completion of their studies; some foreign students are then encouraged to seek employment with U.S. firms to steal proprietary information.”
At TU Delft, Geert Klaas Berghuijs, until recently a senior admissions officer, says TU admissions policy regarding foreign students hasn’t changed post-9/11: ,,When foreign students receive their TU letters of acceptance, they must report to the nearest Dutch embassy, which performs the necessary security-background checks before issuing residence permanents.” This security clearance procedure has become much more stringent, however: ,,In 1997, our MSc program’s first year, I sent the Dutch authorities a one-page letter containing the names of ten Indonesian students who wanted to study at Delft, and those students received their residence permits within 1O days. Today, background checks take at least six weeks before residence permits are issued.”
This heightened sense of awareness is echoed by Profesor Eduard Hoogenboom, whose Interfacutair Research Institute (IRI) works with some of the TU’s most potentially dangerous dual-use technology%nuclear and biological. ,,We’d certainly take a hard look at students applying from countries like Iraq and Libya who wanted to work with certain technologies,” Hoogenboom says. ,,We once had a student from Syria, but he came to us recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a UN agency. We certainly evaluate the type of work students intend to do, the level of risk and what knowledge they’d be taking away with them.”
As for the good/evil Dr. Khan, whose TU studies served his country so well, he certainly won’t be receiving his tickets to the TU Alumni Ball anytime soon.
Comments are closed.